Control
of the ' Common State' It is clear from
analysis of the constitutional structure proposed for the 'common
state' that power would lie with the Greek Cypriots. This is so because
of the composition of the legislative and executive institutions to be
established, namely the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies and the
Presidential Council. All 'common state'
legislation would have to be passed by simple majority in both Houses.
Each House would have 48 members. Half the Senate would be elected by
the Turkish Cypriot State's electorate. The number of the elected
Deputies from each community would be proportional to the population of
each state, with the proviso that there would be at least 12 deputies
from each community. Significantly, and unusually, there is no
provision for any representation of the two 'constituent states' in the
Senate or Chamber of Deputies. Voting would be
by simple majority in both Houses, though votes in favour of a measure
in the Senate would normally require the inclusion of a quarter of each
side's senators present and voting. A 'special majority' of two-fifths
would be required in legislation and decisions on finance, immigration,
foreign affairs, and the election of the executive Presidential
Council. This was to be composed of six members, proportional to the
population of each state, but with at least two from each community.
Voting would be by simple majority, but with at least one vote from
each community member. Under present circumstances, the election of the
Turkish Cypriot members would largely be in the hands of the Greek
Cypriot members of the legislature. These provisions would act as a
brake on Greek Cypriot domination, but deny the political equality so
often promised to the Turkish Cypriots. Property, Territory and
Residence Turkish Cypriot criticism of the UN
Plan has tended to make more of other adverse sections of the Plan than
those provisions outlined above. This is no doubt because the general
populace does not find it easy to address itself to complex
constitutional matters, important though they are. More significant for
them were the Plan's provisions with regard to the return of property
to those displaced by the events of 1974. Whilst not many Turkish
Cypriots want to return to live among the Greek Cypriots, many of the
180,000 Greek Cypriots who mainly fled their homes in 1974 wish to
return. Under the complex property provisions in the Plan, many would
be able to reclaim their properties, whilst some would only be able to
claim compensation. According to UN estimates, some 15000 to 18000
Turkish Cypriots would have to relinquish their homes to former Greek
Cypriot owners. Since the TRNC would be required to surrender some 7
per cent of its land (from the 34 per cent held) there would be 47,000
persons to be relocated in the reduced Turkish Cypriot state.
Altogether, according to UN estimates, there would be between 62,000
and 65,000 displaced persons in the Turkish Cypriot state. Turkish
Cypriot estimates are for 100,000, half the
population. Including those Greek Cypriots who
would return to their properties in the new proposed Turkish Cypriot
state, after a period of 15 years 21 per cent of the population of the
Turkish Cypriot state could be Greek Cypriot. However, there were
ambiguities in the Plan suggesting it could easily constitute a greater
proportion. Notably, there was a provision that would allow the return
of former inhabitants and their descendants to return to some villages
in the Karpas peninsula! In sum, the Turkish
Cypriot Government could see considerable disadvantages in the Plan.
Moreover in addition to the factors described above, there was a strong
feeling that under the operation of EU norms there would be nothing to
stop the Greek Cypriots from investing heavily in the Turkish Cypriot
state, in fact dominating it economically. Quite a number of Turkish
Cypriots expressed the fear that since Greek Cypriots often believed
the island was essentially theirs, they would make every effort to buy
out Turkish Cypriot owners of enterprises and property, even at
uneconomic prices. However, the Opposition parties in the TRNC believe
the Greek Cypriots have changed, and that these views no longer reflect
reality. In support of these sentiments, it might be noted that the a
view is sometimes expressed in the Greek Cypriot press that it would be
an unnecessary expense to unite with the Turkish Cypriots and have to
meet development costs to bring their economy up to the level of that
of the South. Turkish Cypriot Parliamentary Elections, December
2003 The ultimate fate of the Annan Plan was
expected to be decided by the results of the parliamentary elections
held on 14 December 2003. In the run-up to the elections the main item
in dispute was whether the TRNC should return to discuss the Annan
Plan. In particular, the prospect of its opening up the road to EU
membership was attractive to many. Consequently the Opposition parties
stressed how EU membership would provide jobs in a much more developed
Turkish Cypriot economy, in the rest of Cyprus, and in the EU
generally. They pointed also to the failures of the past, particularly
to the tribulations arising from the troubled Turkish economy, to
alleged corruption in government, and to the overriding influence of
Turkey in the TRNC. For instance, the control of the police by the
Turkish military was a particular bone of contention for Mustafa
Akinci, who expressed considerable hostility to
Turkey. The nationalist pro-government, parties
stressed how the Annan Plan would destroy the autonomy of the Turkish
Cypriots and would return them to the situation before 1974. Mainly
they sought to defend the existence of their state, an achievement that
had guaranteed them peace and security for thirty years. They were not
against union of some sort with the Greek Cypriots, and were for EU
membership, but insisted that agreement could only come through
recognition of the existence of the TRNC. in the first place. They were
pro-Turkish, stressing the importance of the aid and succour received.
Hindsight suggests that they did not make enough of their desire to
join the European Union. They were much
heartened by the visit (mentioned above) made to the TRNC on 15
November by the Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdošan, a visit
routinely condemned by the Greek Cypriot Government. Erdošan did not go
so far as to say that the TRNC should first be recognised, but he came
close to it in an important speech. He pointed out that there were 'two
separate democratic states' in Cyprus and he believed 'reconciliation
efforts should be based on these realities' ( Quotations are from a
translation of Erdogan's speech made by the President's Office,
Lefkosa). He further had no doubt 'that the Turkish people of Cyprus
are in a position to become one of the equal partners of the
comprehensive consensus to be reached on the
island' As a result, the elections held
on 14 December 2003 very unusually produced a stalemate. The government
parties, the National Unity Party and the Democratic Party, gained
32.93% and 12.93% of the vote respectively, winning 18 and 7 seats. A
minor party, the Nationalist Peace Party, won 3.23% of the vote, but
under the 5% rule did not qualify for any seats. This party wasted
votes for the nationalist cause. Had it joined one of the two other
nationalist parties, there almost certainly would not have been a
deadlock. On the Opposition side the Republican Turkish Party and the
Peace and Democracy Movement won 35.2% and 13.16% of the vote
respectively, winning 19 and 6 seats. The pro-EU party led by the
Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, the Solution and European Union
Party, earned 1. 99% of the vote, but won no seat. The tiny Cyprus
Justice Party won only 0.6% of the vote. Whilst the Republican Turkish
Party might be described as having won the election, each bloc won 25
seats. Unless a coalition government can be formed, the Constitution
requires that another election be held after 60
days. This unusual and difficult result will
probably not prevent the presentation of new proposals expected from
the Turkish side. They will probably continue to call for a partnership
state between two internationally recognised states. No doubt they will
also call for real political equality in the institutions of a common
state. The Turkish Cypriot Opposition parties will almost certainly
wish to proceed with trying to open new negotiations on the basis of
the Annan Plan, but without necessarily calling for a twostate
solution. A two-state solution might take one
of two forms. A more fundamental version would be for complete
separation of the two states and for international recognition of the
existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This would mean
the removal of international embargoes. In a position, then, then to
develop international tourism, the TRNC would no doubt be able to make
its way very satisfactorily in the world, whether a member of the EU or
not. The second form would be the recognition of the TRNC before a new
joint federal, or confederal, state was established that would then
enter the European Union. The problem for
either version of a two-state solution, promising though such would be,
is the serious difficulty presented by the international recognition of
the Republic of Cyprus that fortuitously, for the Greek Cypriots,
followed the events of 1964. On its own no major state would seem
likely to recognise the TRNC, and at the same time de-recognise the
Republic of Cyprus as sovereign over the whole of the island - least of
all Britain and the United States, with their extensive defence and
listening installations in the South. Could the Greek Cypriots be
persuaded or encouraged to renounce their claim to sovereignty over the
Turkish Cypriots, a claim that is very hard to justify? They could
follow the example of the Irish Parliament, which has renounced its
claims to sovereignty over Northern Ireland. They could do soin return
for satisfaction over return of territory and return to, or
compensation for, property lost in 1974. In this regard it has also to
be borne in mind that between 1963 and 1974, and in 1974, the Turkish
Cypriots also abandoned many properties. This approach would pave the
way for a two-state solution of whichever sort, thus relieving the EU
of the considerable difficulties it faces if the Republic of Cyprus
enters the EU in May 2004 with part of its alleged territory not under
its control, when it could be maintained that the TRNC was 'occupied'
without EU authority by Turkish troops. Perhaps
the only way to bring about the very desirable renunciation by the
Greek Cypriots of their sovereignty over the Turkish Cypriots would be
for other states to begin, or threaten to begin, a process of
recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This would be
highly unwelcome to the Greek Cypriots. Former President Glafcos
Clerides recently announced that, when in office, he had made effective
representations to the UN Secretary-General to dissuade four Arab
states from their intention to recognise the TRNC. However, the more
likely way forward, given the strength of the desire recently shown in
the TRNC to enter the EU, is renewed pressure by the international
community on the TRNC to discuss the Annan Plan, or some version of it,
without any promise of prior international recognition of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. Recognition of the TRNC is sometimes
dismissed as a matter that would be of no practical value after an
agreement was signed, but by recognising their political equality, it
would provide psychological encouragement and security for the Turkish
Cypriots and thus make them much more amenable to a solution. However,
all is in flux until a new Turkish Cypriot government is formed with a
clear majority to make the important decisions that lie ahead.
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