The
'Annan Plan' and the Cyprus Conflict Prof. Clement Dodd Published with
the permission of the YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAW. This article
was first published in the Journal of Yeditepe University Faculty
of Law. Prof Dr Clement Dodd is a
professorial Research Associate in the School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London. He is the author of
Cyprus Imbroglio 1998, The Need for New Perspectives on Cyprus , Storm
Clouds over Cyprus 2002 and Discord on Cyprus-The UN Plan and After
2003 (The Eothen Press, England) The lack of
solution of the Cyprus problem 'could be an important obstacle' to
Turkey's accession to the EU, according to the November 2003 Progress
report of the European Commission. Let this be misconstrued, the Head
of the EU Representation in Turkey, Hansjorg Kretscher, affirmed that a
settlement of the Cyprus problem was not a pre-condition for Turkey's
accession, but added that Turkey's contribution to finding a solution
would have a positive impact on the EU process. The President of the
European Parliament, Pat Cox, also stated that a Cyprus solution would
not be a political condition for Turkey, but also pointed out that in
politics people assess issues in a comprehensive manner. The solution
of the Cyprus problem was not a political condition, but he believed
that with the resolution of the problem, the atmosphere with regard to
Turkey-EU relations would change in many capitals. Gunther Verheugen,
the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, has repeatedly stressed the
importance for Turkey of a Cyprus solution, whilst, in turn, not going
so far as to say that its solution was a prior condition for Turkey's
accession. It has sometimes been stated, or
implied, that Turkey is responsible for a solution. In this regard,
refuting any such suggestion, the Turkish Foreign Minister has
emphasised that responsibility for the Cyprus problem cannot be placed
on Turkey alone. Yet the representatives of the UN, the EU, the United
States and Britain have all been loud in their assertions that the
solution lies through acceptance of the 'Annan Plan', as the UN Plan
submitted at the end of 2002 has come to be known. Since the Annan Plan
was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot Government with the approval of the
Turkish Government, it would seem to be expected that Turkey could use
its influence to modify Turkish Cypriot attitudes. Nor are the
pressures just international. Within Turkey there are sections of
opinion that believe Turkey has an obligation well above others to
bring about acceptance of the Plan. For instance, the Chairman of the
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation has warned that Turkey
will be unable to enter the EU unless it makes a sincere contribution
to solving the Cyprus issue. Yet in his recent, important speech in
North Cyprus (15 November 2003) the Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip
Erdogan, made no reference to the Annan Plan. Referring to the
existence of two states, he insisted that any settlement must be
bi-zonal and must preserve the equal status and political equality of
the Turkish Cypriots. Does the Annan Plan provide for these
requirements as its authors and supporters seem to believe? The Annan
Plan The Opposition parties in the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus support the UN Plan. It is clear that they
are much influenced by the membership of the European Union to which it
would lead. The economy of the TRNC, severely impaired ever since 1974
by the international embargoes (supported by the EU) suffers from
unemployment, or under-employment, for many. This is particularly felt
by young people. Membership of the EU would provide a much more
attractive future for them than at present available. Free from
embargoes, international tourism would be able to develop in the North
and Turkish Cypriots would be able to work in principle anywhere in the
European Union. Also for them the warnings of the older generation that
the Greek Cypriots are not to be trusted, and will seek to dominate the
North, often seem to fall on deaf ears. For the young it is now a
different world, They believe that Greek Cypriot attitudes have changed
and that they will be safe from domination by virtue of being members
of the post-modern European Union. Moreover the Plan seeks to provide a
solution of the problem by following the Belgian pattern, a country
where there is a serious division between its two constituent peoples.
The Turkish Cypriots would still have their own state, as would the
Greek Cypriots, alongside a joint, or 'common state'. Moreover, it is
stated in the Plan that between the two 'constituent' states and the
'Common state' the relationship would not be hierarchical. The
'constituent states' would also have significant functions. These would
include education and culture, health, fisheries, agriculture, internal
commerce and industry, and local police. As in Belgium, each of the
'constituent states' would be able, if need be, themselves to represent
their own interests in these areas in the councils of the European
Union. They would not have to be represented by members of the 'common
state'. They could even develop international relations in some
spheres. Moreover, it has been asserted by many international statesmen
in support of the Plan that the 'common state' would in practice have
little to do, with much legislation emanating from the European Union.
In addition, in his Report on the failure of the Plan, the UN
Secretary-General points out that, in deference to Turkish Cypriot
views, it was proposed that the Swiss model was appropriate for a
federal structure. Consequently, it was allowed in the Plan that only
in certain specified functions would the Turkish Cypriot state be
transferring sovereignty to the 'common state'. This is claimed to
accord with the Turkish Cypriot position, as stressed in earlier years,
that they regarded themselves as sovereign except insofar as they had
transferred items of sovereignty to the centre. However, in more recent
years the Turkish Cypriots have made it clear in advancing 'equal
partnership' (essentially confederal) proposals for a solution they
would be transferring functions, not
sovereignty. When the Plan seems to confer so
many benefits, and is conceived within the ethos of the brave new
post-modern world of the European Union, why should any Turkish
Cypriots object to it? The Opposition parties in the TRNC, or at least
some of their younger supporters, appear to be carried away by the new
anti-nationalist idealism of the European Union. Others see the
economic benefits they expect to receive as EU members. So what could
be the objections? The first point to be made
is that although the Plan would fittingly have been advanced, or at
least approved, by the 'constituent states' this was not to the
case. It was intended that the Plan, embracing the whole scheme, would
simply be accepted by the leaders of each community, and then approved
by referenda in both the South and the North. This is very strange. Why
were the two 'constituent' states not being given the function of
actually 'constituting', and approving, the new structure? If they did
not have this function they could hardly be called 'constituent'
states. Ab initio , the Plan avoids the involvement of the two states;
this served, of course, to avoid any recognition of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. The early resort to referenda is also
particularly worrying. Complex schemes like those in the Plan have to
be fully digested and discussed before being put to referenda, a
notoriously dangerous way to make decisions on anything but simple and
straightforward issues. Incidentally, a later
change that annoyed the Turkish Cypriots was the proposal in the Plan
to call the new overall political structure the 'United Republic of
Cyprus'. This seemed to imply that the original Republic of Cyprus had
become disunited after the Turkish Cypriots claimed to be no longer
part of it, but was now to be reunited! The Turkish Cypriots have also
wanted the creation of a new state, as seemed earlier to be promised by
the United Nations. However, in the Plan there is only reference to the
creation of a 'new state of affairs', not the same thing by a long
way. To turn to more concrete matters, although
the unimportance of the 'common state' was often stressed, Gunther
Verheugen has constantly insisted that the 'common state' must be
strong enough to perform EU functions. These would include the
responsibility, as in Belgium, for the 'common state' to ensure that
each of the 'constituent states' budget deficits did not go above 3 per
cent of gross domestic product, in accordance with EU rules. In
accordance with EU norms, the 'common state; would also ensure that
acquis rules were applied throughout Cyprus. These would include free
movement of labour and capital, and freedom to live anywhere. This last
freedom was in fact restricted in the Plan, as will be seen, but such
limitations would always be struggling against the unrestrictive basic
philosophy of the European Union. In the conditions required under the
acquis , in so small an island as Cyprus there would also be a felt
need for common systems of social security and private taxation. In
short the 'common state ' could be expected to acquire more and more
legislative and supervisory functions. These
would add to the already considerable functions ascribed in the Plan to
the 'common state'. These comprised external and EU affairs, Central
Bank functions, all indirect taxation ( including value added tax, and
customs and excise duties), economic and external trade policy,
national resources, responsibility for territorial waters and the
continental shelf, communications overall (including telecommunications
and air travel), immigration [a thorny subject], anti-terrorist
measures and the common state police. In brief, the 'common state'
would control the application of EU legislation and EU norms, as well
as itself having some substantial functions. It is arguable that for
the sake of economy and efficiency, 'common state' functions would need
to be fairly comprehensive, but the question has to be asked, where
would power lie in the 'common state'?
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